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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 13-3154
_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALQUINTON DEVON MCNEIL, a/k/a Cue
Alquinton Devon McNeil,
Appellant
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(No. 5-11-cr-00604-001)
District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 17, 2014
____________

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 24, 2014)
____________
OPINION
____________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Alquinton McNeil pleaded guilty to various narcotics and firearms charges and
was sentenced to fifty-seven months of imprisonment, six years of supervised release,
and, relevant to this appeal, a $1000 fine. He now appeals, challenging the imposition of
the fine and further arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his
presentencing motion for new counsel. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I.
We write solely for the parties and will therefore recount only those facts that are
essential to our disposition. On December 5, 2012, McNeil entered an open guilty plea to
an indictment that charged him with: (1) distributing cocaine base within 1000 feet of a
school in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 860(a); (2) distributing
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); (3) selling a firearm to
a known felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(1) and 924(a)(2); (4) being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); and (5)
possessing and selling a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2).
The Probation Office’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) assigned McNeil a total
offense level of nineteen and a criminal history category of five, yielding an advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months of imprisonment. The
PSR also indicated that, based on McNeil’s total offense level, he was subject to a fine in
the range of $6000 to $2,000,000. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); United States
Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 5E1.2(c)(3), (4). Finding that McNeil had more
than $11,500 in confirmed liabilities and no assets or legitimate income, the PSR
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concluded that McNeil was unable to pay a within-Guidelines fine and recommended that
any fine imposed be minimal.
Neither the Government nor defense counsel filed objections to the PSR. McNeil
lodged several objections to the PSR’s criminal history section in a pro se letter to the
court dated March 17, 2013, and, in April 25 and June 15, 2013 letters, he further moved
to withdraw his guilty plea and for substitute counsel at sentencing.1 McNeil’s request
for new counsel was premised on his contention that his appointed counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance by, inter alia, being unprepared for McNeil’s preliminary
arraignment and failing to file “any omnibus pretrial motions.” Appendix (“App.”) 134
(quotation marks omitted). In response, McNeil’s counsel described his relationship with
McNeil as “tenuous” and observed that McNeil did not appear to trust his advice. App.
133 (quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, counsel expressed his willingness to
continue to represent McNeil through his sentencing.
At McNeil’s sentencing hearing, which was held on June 24, 2013, McNeil
reasserted his request for new counsel. The District Court orally denied McNeil’s
motion, finding that the motion was untimely and comprised “mere conclusionary
allegations” regarding counsel’s ineffectiveness. See App. 155–60. After the court ruled
on McNeil’s motion for substitute counsel, McNeil withdrew his objections to the PSR as
well as his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. App. 161–65. After considering the

1

McNeil’s pro se letters to the District Court, and counsel’s response thereto, are not in
the record. Both parties discuss the contents of the letters by reference to McNeil’s
sentencing hearing, at which the court summarized and quoted the documents. See, e.g.,
McNeil Br. 6, 14–15; Gov’t Br. 5–6. We will do the same.
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factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of
fifty-seven months of imprisonment on Counts One, Three, Four, and Five, to be served
concurrently, plus a six-year term of supervised release and a $400 special assessment.2
The court also imposed a no-interest fine in the total amount of $1000, to be paid in
monthly installments of $12.50 during McNeil’s term of imprisonment and $50 during
his term of supervised release, “until the balance is paid in full or supervision is over,
whichever comes first.” App. 196. McNeil timely appealed.
II.3
McNeil first argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the District
Court’s denial of his motion for substitute counsel before sentencing. We review a
district court’s refusal to substitute counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 207 n.10 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092,
1098 (3d Cir. 1995).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants the right to appointed
counsel, but that right is “not without limit and cannot be the justification for . . .
manipulation of the appointment system.” Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 145 (3d
Cir. 2004). To warrant a last-minute substitution of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate “good cause,” such as “a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in
communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with his attorney.” United States v. Welty,
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No sentence was imposed on Count Two because it was a lesser-included offense of
Count One. See United States v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2006).
3
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982). Disagreement over legal strategy does not constitute
good cause. Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 207 n.10; Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098. If the district court
denies the request and the defendant decides to proceed with unwanted counsel, we will
not find a Sixth Amendment violation unless: (1) the district court’s good cause
determination was “clearly erroneous,” or (2) the district court made no inquiry into the
reasons underlying the defendant’s request. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098.
McNeil concedes that the District Court inquired into the reason for his request to
substitute counsel. He contends, however, that the inquiry was insufficient because the
court failed to “explore” fully the “nature and status” of his relationship with his counsel
and instead “devoted the bulk of its inquiry to examining [counsel’s] conduct and finding
it to be satisfactory.” McNeil Br. 9, 15–17 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548
U.S. 140, 148 (2006) (distinguishing the right to counsel of choice — which is the “right
to a particular lawyer regardless of comparative effectiveness” — with the right to
effective counsel — which “imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever
lawyer is chosen or appointed”)).
“It is settled that a district court may not deny a substitution motion simply
because the court thinks current counsel’s representation is adequate.” United States v.
Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
After all, “[e]ven if a defendant’s counsel is competent, a serious breakdown in
communication can result in an inadequate defense.” Id. While explaining its denial of
McNeil’s motion, the District Court at times conflated the effective assistance and goodcause inquiries. See, e.g., App. 159 (“You’re entitled to an effective attorney . . . and
5

nothing more and nothing less.”); App. 159–60 (“Because [counsel is not] ineffective, the
law doesn’t give you the right nor me the power to fire [him] and hire another attorney at
taxpayers’ expense to represent you.”). Our inquiry does not end here, however. As
previously discussed, we will affirm the court’s denial of McNeil’s motion for new
counsel so long as the court independently and correctly determined that McNeil failed to
show good cause for the motion. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098. We conclude that it did.
The District Court began McNeil’s sentencing hearing by summarizing McNeil’s
pro se requests for new counsel and counsel’s response thereto. App. 132-36. The court
then addressed McNeil directly:
THE COURT: Now, Mr. McNeil, has defense counsel correctly advised
me that you are still pursuing the complaints and the requests made in your
three letters to me?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Now, is there anything else other than what you
contained in the three letters that you want to say to me in support of your
requests for a new lawyer, or did you cover it all in your letters to me?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, there was still some more stuff in the PSR —
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: — that I wanted to point out.
THE COURT: All right. Well, okay, I’ll — if I — if I obtain new counsel
for you, if I agree with your request for new counsel, then the new counsel
will handle any objections you have to the presentence report.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: . . . . But in terms of your request for a new lawyer, is there
anything else that you’d like to say to me in support of that, other than what
you’ve written in the second and third letter[s] to me, the two letters that
dealt with his alleged ineffectiveness?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
App. 137–38 (emphases added).
Finally, the court asked defense counsel to respond to McNeil’s allegations.
Counsel acknowledged that he and McNeil “had some tense moments in [their]
6

relationship[]” but stated that he was able to “move forward here and represent [McNeil]
today here at sentencing and feel as though he got as good a representation as he could
have gotten from the get-go and walk out of here feeling that way.” App. 140. Based on
the foregoing testimony, the court concluded that McNeil had failed to show a “complete
breakdown in communication” or “any irreconcilable conflict” between him and his
counsel. App. 155.
The District Court inquired into McNeil’s reasons for seeking new counsel and,
upon doing so, found that McNeil failed to show good cause for his request. Because
McNeil expressed only disagreement with his counsel’s legal strategies, this
determination was not clearly erroneous. Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 207 n.10; Goldberg, 67 F.3d
at 1098. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying McNeil’s
motion for substitute counsel.4
III.
McNeil also contends that the District Court erroneously imposed a $1000 fine.
“Where, as here, a defendant did not at sentencing raise the issue of his or her inability to
pay, a sentencing court’s decision to impose a fine and the amount of the fine is reviewed
for plain error.” United States v. Torres, 209 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2000).
4

McNeil also challenges the court’s decision to inquire about the status of his
relationship with counsel in open court, which McNeil alleges “exacerbated” the conflict
between him and counsel. McNeil Br. 9, 18–20. There is no general requirement that
hearings on motions for new counsel be held ex parte and, contrary to McNeil’s position,
no reason why an ex parte hearing was necessary in this case. Cf. United States v.
Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 1997) (district court abused its discretion by
inviting defense counsel to undermine his client’s veracity in open court, leaving the
defendant “to fend for himself,” without representation by counsel (quotation marks
omitted)).
7

The advisory Sentencing Guidelines provide that, “[t]he court shall impose a fine
in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not
likely to become able to pay any fine.” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). A defendant seeking to
avoid paying a fine “has the burden of coming forward with evidence from which the
[district court] could find it more likely than not that any fine would remain unpaid.”
United States v. Kadonsky, 242 F.3d 516, 520 (3d Cir. 2001). Once the defendant
proffers such evidence, the district court “may not impose a fine without making findings
concerning the defendant’s ability to pay it.” Id. The sentencing court must consider an
array of factors, including: (1) the defendant’s income, earning capacity, and financial
resources, and (2) the burden of the fine on the defendant and his dependents relative to
the burden that alternative punishments would impose. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)(1), (2);
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d). “The amount of the fine should always be sufficient to ensure that
the fine, taken together with other sanctions imposed, is punitive.” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)
(emphasis added).
McNeil principally argues that the District Court failed to consider adequately his
ability to pay the fine imposed. We disagree. At McNeil’s sentencing hearing, the court
accepted the PSR’s recommendation that McNeil was unable to pay a within-Guidelines
fine of $6000 to $2,000,000. It nevertheless found that imposition of a “modest” fine was
appropriate, both to punish McNeil for his involvement in gun and drug trafficking and to
ensure McNeil’s eligibility for the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial
Responsibility Plan (“IFRP”). The court specifically opined that McNeil’s participation
in the prison work program for the duration of his sentence would enable McNeil to
8

reduce significantly the fine amount and to save remaining funds for commissary
purchases. App. 207. More importantly, the court observed that McNeil would acquire
training and experience that would facilitate his obtaining legitimate employment upon
his release. App. 207.
The facts set forth in the PSR, which the court adopted, support its conclusion.
McNeil was thirty-seven years old at the time of sentencing. PSR ¶ 52. He has a ninthgrade education, and he earned a high-school degree by passing the General Educational
Development (“GED”) examination as a student in the Oneonta, New York Job Corps
program. PSR ¶ 66. From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, he reportedly held shortterm positions at various restaurants — including McDonald’s, Taco Bell, and Olive
Garden — in Easton and Fogelsville, Pennsylvania. PSR ¶ 69. Between 2008 and 2012,
McNeil received under-the-table income from work as a bouncer at clubs in Allentown
and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. PSR ¶ 68. He is in good health, with no mental or
emotional problems or treatment for the same. PSR ¶¶ 59, 62. In light of these skills and
characteristics — which will be supplemented by the training acquired through his
participation in the IFRP — McNeil has not shown that he will be unable to repay the
balance of the fine in $50 monthly installments over a period of six years.
In summary, the District Court considered McNeil’s financial situation and
imposed a fine commensurate with its assessment. The unchallenged facts in the PSR
support the court’s decision. Accordingly, the court did not err, let alone plainly err, in

9

imposing the below-Guidelines fine.5
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.

5

McNeil also argues that the court failed to address the effect of the fine on his
dependents. For substantially the same reasons discussed above, this argument is not
persuasive.
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